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DON'T ACCEPT RIDES FROM STRANGERS:
THE SUPREME COURT HASTENS THE
DEMISE OF PASSENGER PRIVACY IN
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILES
Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Wyoming v. Houghton,' the United States Supreme Court
held that a police officer who has probable cause to search a car
may search any container within the car that might contain the
object of the search, including the belongings of a passenger
unsuspected of any criminal behavior. In so holding, the Court
rejected the lower court's assertion that the personal effects of a
passenger unsuspected of criminal activity are outside of the
scope of a lawful automobile search.2 The Court based its hold-
ing primarily on the notion that the common law existing dur-
ing the framing of the Constitution would not have
differentiated among items to be included in a valid search
based upon ownership.3 In addition, the Court believed that
the need to protect the privacy interests of a passenger did not
justify the excessive difficulties such protections would create
for police officers in the field.4
This Note reviews both the genesis and interpretation of the
warrantless automobile search, as well as the other legal princi-
ples implicated in the search of a passenger's effects. This Note
argues that the Court erred by condoning a search conducted
without individualized suspicion, because the facts of this case
did not meet the requirements of previously allowed suspicion-
less searches. This Note further argues that the Court's denial
of any meaningful expectation of privacy for passengers is in-
consistent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Finally, this
' 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999).
2 Id. at 1300.
'Id. at 1300-01.
Id. at 1303.
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Note argues that the Court overstated the potential problems of
the Wyoming Supreme Court's "passenger's property rule."5
This Note concludes that the passenger's property rule offers a
workable standard for police officers in the field, while adhering
to the traditional notions of individualized suspicion and indi-
vidual privacy.
II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects "[the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures" and ensures that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause. ' While it would be a gross oversimplification
to declare that there is any one purpose for the Amendment
7
the Supreme Court has declared that the "basic purpose of this
Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court,
is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against ar-
bitrary invasions by government officials."' When a government
action is suspected of violating the Fourth Amendment, the
Court will often peer back through history to see if the framers
would have approved of an analogous action.9 In addition (or
often instead), the Court will evaluate the action's "reasonable-
ness" by "balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate gov-
ernmental interests.'"
' Id. at 1303.
6 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
7 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (Fourth Amendment
originally intended to prohibit the "pre-Revolutionary practice of using general war-
rants or 'writs of assistance' to authorize searches for contraband by officers of the
crown"); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1977) ("[T]he Framers were men
who focused on the wrongs of the day but who intended the Fourth Amendment to
safeguard fundamental values which would far outlast the specifics which gave it
birth."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968) (Amendment protects the "inestimable
right of personal security").
' Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S.
523, 528 (1967).
' See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
'0 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). See also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47, 50-51 (1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977); United States




The phrase "individualized suspicion" does not appear in
the text of the Fourth Amendment, but the concept-that the
suspicion of criminal activity underlying a government intrusion
into a person's privacy should be calibrated toward the actions
of that person-has played a significant role in the development
of search and seizure jurisprudence." Indeed, Professor Tho-
mas Clancy2 has argued that individualized suspicion was an as-
sumed element of a reasonable search or seizure at the time of
the framing of the Constitution. Professor Clancy explained,
[G]iven the historical background, characterized by suspicionless
searches and seizures pursuant to general warrants, the litigation and
outcry concerning those abuses, the antecedent colonial constitutional
efforts to prevent general warrants, the importance attached to the ne-
cessity of establishing individualized suspicion to issue a common-law
search warrant, and the drafting process of the [Fourth] Amendment it-
self, it takes little deductive reasoning to conclude that a chief goal of the
framers was to prevent the historical abuses associated with suspicionless searches
and seizures predating the Amendment. The framers believed individual-
ized suspicion to be an inherent component of the concept of reason-
ableness. 4
The Supreme Court has long considered individualized
suspicion to be a threshold requirement for most permissible
searches and seizures. 5  This requirement has endured
throughout the twentieth century, even as the Court has low-
ered the level of suspicion needed to sustain the reasonableness
of a search. First, when the Court created certain exceptions to
the warrant requirement and permitted police officers in some
circumstances to conduct warrantless searches based on prob-
able cause, it reiterated that the lower standards were to be used
" See generally Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 483 (1995).
'2 Assistant Attorney General, State of Maryland; Adjunct Faculty, University of
Maryland School of Law.
"See Clancy, supra note 11.
14 Clancy, supra note 11, at 530 (emphasis added).
'3 Se e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997) ("To be reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspi-
cion of wrongdoing."); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) ("[T]he Fourth
Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific, objective facts indicat-




only on an individual basis.16 Second, in Terry v. Ohio, 7 when the
Court held that a police officer could conduct a limited pat-
down search of an individual with only reasonable suspicion to
believe the person was armed, the Court reaffirmed the impor-
tance of specificity of suspicion. After outlining this new police
power, the Court restricted this power strictly to "the individual
whose suspicious behavior [the officer] is investigating at close
range.
Despite the historical importance afforded the concept of
individualized suspicion, it does not stand as an absolute pre-
requisite for a reasonable search or seizure.19 In certain situa-
tions, the Court has ruled that "special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement" - will necessitate departure
from the traditional requirement. To determine whether a par-
ticular search fits within this "closely guarded category of consti-
tutionally permissible suspicionless searches,"2' the Court will
balance the private and public interests involved.22 Specifically,
the Court will decide whether this is one of the "limited circum-
stances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are
minimal, and where an important governmental interest fur-
thered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a re-
quirement of individualized suspicion. 25
In the context of automobile searches and seizures, the
Court has used this balancing test to approve suspicionless sei-
zures at fixed border checkpoints24 and sobriety checkpoints.25
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Court assessed the constitu-
'" See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (new ability to con-
duct warrantless searches of automobiles should not be used to stop all of the drivers
on the highway, but only those who officers have probable cause to believe are carry-
ing contraband).
,7 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
"Id. at 24.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976). The
Court stated that while "some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a pre-
requisite to a constitutional search or seizure ... the Fourth Amendment imposes no
irreducible requirement of such suspicion." Id.
20 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting NewJersey v. TLO, 469
U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun,J., concurring)).
2 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
22rd.
"Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
21 See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543.
"See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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tionality of briefly stopping a vehicle for questioning at fixed
border checkpoints when there was no reason to believe the
particular car contained illegal aliens. 2' The Court held that
such seizures 27 do not violate the Fourth Amendment.28 After
detailing the extent of the problem of illegal immigration,2 the
Court found a brief vehicle stop followed by a border official's
request that a motorist answer one or two questions or possibly
produce a document relating to citizenship to be a minimal in-
trusion of privacy.30 The stop at a fixed checkpoint is certainly
less intrusive than the stops conducted by roving patrols, the
Court reasoned, because the fixed stop would be less surprising,
frightening, or annoying to drivers.3 r Furthermore, the fixed
checkpoint stops are less susceptible to "discretionary enforce-
ment activity. '  Finally, the Court believed the procedure
served a valid government interest.
3 3
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Court con-
fronted the constitutionality of stopping vehicles at sobriet
checkpoints.3 After finding that such stops were "seizures,"
the Court held that they do not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.s In balancing the public and private interests involved in
the case, the Court was influenced, first, by the extent of the
problem of drunk driving and, thus, the state's interest in eradi-
cating it.37 Second, the Court condoned the "effectiveness" of
this particular sobriety checkpoint, which it defined as "the ex-
tent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance [the
26 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545.
27 Id. at 556. The Court stated, "It is agreed that checkpoint stops are 'seizures'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. See also Brower v. County of
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (seizure occurs whenever "there is a governmental
termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied' (emphasis in
original)).
2Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545.
9id. at 551.




496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990).
"Id. at 450.
Id. at 455.
37 Id. at 45 1.
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interest of preventing drunken driving]."s Finally, the Court
found the privacy intrusion of the brief stop involved to be
"slight."'3 9
As may already be apparent from the Court's reasoning in
Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, the Court has allowed suspicionless po-
lice intrusions to proceed once it is satisfied that the searches
are a necessary and effective means of addressing a compelling
government interest. In such situations, the Court feels com-
fortable relying on "other safeguards... to assure that the indi-
vidual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to the
discretion of the official in the field., 40 However, when the in-
terest proffered by the police seems less than compelling, the
Court will draw the line. Thus, in Delaware v. Prouse, where the
stopping of motorists was not part of an organized sobriety
dragnet or established border checkpoint but rather the ran-
dom stopping of motorists to check the validity of their licenses
and registration, the Court found the practice unreasonable.4'
In the Court's opinion, the stops were made in too arbitrary a
fashion 42 and subject to the "standardless and unconstrained43
discretion" of the officers. Without evidence to the efficacy of
these random stops, the Court would not allow them.44 In other
words, the Court hinted that it might have looked more favora-
bly upon the actions of the officers in Prouse if police statistics
showed that unauthorized driving were a rampant, dangerous
problem and random stops the cure. This is a farfetched sce-
nario to be sure, but indicative of the Court's approach to the
issue.
Id. at 455. The Saginaw County checkpoint in question detained 126 vehicles
during its 75-minute tenure. During that time, two drivers were arrested for driving
under the influence, or 1.6% of the drivers passing through the checkpoint. In as-
sessing "effectiveness" of drunken driving reduction techniques, the Court does not
evaluate the techniques against a bright-line efficacy level. Rather, the Court meas-
ures a particular practice against alternative practices available. Thus, the Court
noted how the 1.6% arrest rate of the Saginaw County checkpoint coincided with tes-
timony given at trial that sobriety checkpoints nationwide yielded arrest rates ap-
proximating 1% of all motorists stopped. Id.
39 Id. at 451.
" Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655 (1979) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
4' Id. at 663.
42 Id. at 661-63.




B. EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY ANALYSIS
Before a person can evoke the protections of the Fourth
Amendment, he must demonstrate a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the area or in the item unreasonably searched.45 Prov-
ing that such an expectation exists is a two-step process.46 First,
the "person [must] have exhibited an actual (subjective) expec-
tation of privacy," and, second, the expectation must "be one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'
4, 7
The first step of this process is almost always satisfied. All a
person must do is demonstrate that "he seeks to preserve [the
area or item] as private. 48 The second step is much harder to
sadsfy.49 Sometimes, the Court does not simply determine
whether the expectation is objectively reasonable or not. It may
deem a particular expectation objectively reasonable, but go on
to assign the expectation a relative strength to be used later
when balancing the privacy interests of the individual against
the public interests involved in the case."°
Certain identifiable factors have emerged from the case law
that influence the Court's findings regarding a person's expec-
tation of privacy. One such factor is the person's relationship
with the state. When the state has any sort of custodial or su-
pervisory responsibility toward the person, the person's expecta-
tions of privacy are lessened. For example, the Court has ruled
that children have less of an expectation of privacy in their per-
sons while at school,5' that probationers have a reduced expecta-
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan,J., concurring).46 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
47 Id. (Harlan,J., concurring).
"' Id. at 351. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988) (subjective
expectation of privacy demonstrated by placing garbage in opaque trash bags); Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (surmising that even "a burglar plying his
trade in a summer cabin during the off season may have a thoroughly justified subjec-
tive expectation of privacy"). But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979)
(holding no subjective expectation of privacy exhibited in phone numbers conveyed
to the phone company for the purposes of dialing).
" See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40 (subjective, but not objective expectation of pri-
vacy); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139-40 (subjective, but not objective, expectation of privacy).
"o See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that schoolchildren have
some legitimate expectation of privacy in the items they bring to school, but the





tion in the privacy of their homes,- and that prisoners have no
expectation of privacy in their person."
A second factor important to courts, generally, is the extent
to which the person had prior notice of the possibility of a pri-
vacy intrusion. Where a person has been explicitly notified of a
potential search or seizure before suffering the intrusion, the
Court is less likely to find a valid or strong expectation of pri-
vacy.54 For example, where employees of the United States Cus-
toms Service were notified beforehand that promotion to
certain positions required passing a drug test, the Court found
the employees' expectation of privacy to be diminished. 55 Simi-
larly, the Second Circuit found an airline passenger's privacy in-
terests to be reduced, generally, where a sign in the boarding
area read, "PASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE SUBJECT TO
SEARCH."
6
When a person voluntarily exposes an activity or object to
public view, the Supreme Court has hesitated to find any objec-
tive expectation of privacy, even where the person made a
minimal attempt to conceal the activity or object. Thus, a per-
son has no objective expectation of privacy in the trash he puts57 o
on the curb, the marijuana he cultivates in a partially covered
greenhouse, 58 or the phone numbers he "convey[s]" to the tele-
phone company by dialing them.59
Finally, the Court will find a diminished the expectation of
privacy for any person who voluntarily engages in a heavily regu-
lated industry. For example, in the railroad industry, the
Court reasoned that the employees should have realized that
those responsible for such a potentially dangerous and hazard-
ous occupation might be especially inquisitive about employees'
health, fitness, and judgment.
5' See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
"SeeBell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979).
See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989);
United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974).
See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n.2.
56 See Edwards, 498 F.2d at 501.
57 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
'a SeeFloridav. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
'9 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
See, e.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672; Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989).
6 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627.
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In the context of vehicle searches, the Court has held that a
person has a lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile.62
Consistent with the factors just discussed, the Court has justified
this reduction of privacy for automobiles by noting that auto-
mobiles are exposed to public view,63 that automobiles seldom
serve "as one's residence or as the repository of personal ef-
fects,"r' and that automobiles are subject to extensive govern-
ment regulation.0
C. AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES
1. Creation of the Automobile Exception
While the Fourth Amendment speaks of the process of issu-
ing warrants, it does not specify when warrants are required.
The Court, however, has historically favored the warrant process
and has proclaimed that all searches "conducted outside of the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few specifically es-
tablished and well-delineated exceptions. '' 6  The Court first
recognized one such exception, the automobile exception, sev-
enty-five years ago in Carroll v. United States.
In Carroll, federal prohibition agents stopped a car they be-
lieved to be carrying bootleg liquor.6e They searched the car,
found bottles of whiskey within the upholstery of the seats, and
arrested the occupants. The Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of the search and proclaimed that an automobile or other
vehicle may be searched without a warrant, provided that a
competent, authorized officer performed the search with prob-
able cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband.70
"2 See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974). See alsoJames A. Adams, The Su-
preme Court's Improbable Justifications for Restriction of Citizens' Fourth Amendment Privacy
Expectations in Automobiles, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 833, 841-42 (1999) (arguing that the ra-
tionales of public exposure and pervasive regulation do not logically support the re-
duction of privacy people experience in automobiles).
63 CardweY, 417 U.S. at 590.
6 Id.
"SeeSouth Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
6Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
"7 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
Id. at 135.
"Id. at 136.
70 Id. at 147-55.
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The Courtjustified this exception by recognizing the difference
between searches of fixed premises and searches of vehicles, the
latter capable of being "quickly moved out of the locality orju-
risdiction in which the warrant must be sought.' Considering
this mobility, the Court concluded that to require officers to se-
cure warrants before searching vehicles would risk the loss of
potential evidence.72
2. Early Protection for Containers Found Within the Automobile
Five decades after Carroll, the Court began to refine the
scope of the automobile exception.73 First, in United States v.
Chadwick,74 the Court held that a footlocker was unlike an auto-
mobile and could not be searched without a warrant. Federal
narcotics agents with probable cause to believe it contained
marijuana lawfully seized the footlocker only seconds after it was
placed in the trunk of the defendant's car. At first blush, the
footlocker would seem to have the same "mobility" as a vehicle
(and thus, trigger the same fears which led the Court to create
the automobile exception), but the Court differentiated the two
by stating that a "diminished expectation of privacy . . . sur-
rounds the automobile."76 The expectation of privacy is less-
ened, the Court explained, because the automobile travels
public thoroughfares and is subject to extensive government
regulation.77
Two years later, in Arkansas v. Sanders,78 the Court again
faced the search of personal luggage that happened to be re-
covered from a vehicle. In Sanders, the police recovered a suit-
case, which they had probable cause to believe contained
71 Id. at 153.
7 Id. To satisfy the automobile exception today, probable cause must exist to be-
lieve the car contains contraband or other evidence of a crime and is "readily mo-
bile." See Maryland v. Dyson, 119 S. Ct. 2013, 2014 (1999). No separate finding of
exigency is required. Id. "Readily mobile" does not mean currently mobile, only po-
tentially mobile. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985) (motor home sus-
ceptible to automobile exception because it was potentially mobile, licensed to
operate on public streets, and situated in an area not used for residential purposes).73 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977).
7 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
75 Id. at 15.76 Id. at 12-13.
7 Id.
78 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
884 [Vol. 90
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marijuana, from the trunk of a taxi after following the taxi for a
few blocks from the airport.7 Despite finding that the suitcase
was properly seized, the Court held that the search of the suit-
case was illegal, and commented that, "there is no greater need
for warrantless searches of luggage taken from automobiles
than of luggage taken from other places."0
The Court faced a different, though related question in
Robbins v. California.1 In Robbins, police officers stopped the pe-
titioner for driving erratically. 2 Based on petitioner's clumsy
behavior following the stop and a noticeable odor of marijuana
coming from the car, the officers searched the passenger com-
partment, discovering marijuana and drug paraphernalia." The
officers then searched the tailgate area of the station wagon,
discovering 30 Rounds of marijuana packed in two opaque,
green packages. While the probable cause present in Chadwick
and Sanders had extended only to the footlocker and the suit-
case, respectively, the probable cause in Robbins extended to the
car as a whole. Forced to determine the exact parameters of a
general automobile search, the Court held that, in such a situa-
tion, any opaque container discovered during a lawful automo-
bile search, whether considered a "personal" or "impersonal"
container, could not be opened without a warrant.
6
3. The Bright Line Rule of Ross
The protection afforded to containers by Chadwick, Sanders,
and Robbins was short-lived. Robbins was overruled less than a
year after it was decided by the Court's decision in United States
v. Ross.7 In Ross, the Court worried that the exclusion allowed
by Robbins would largely negate the intended effect of the auto-
mobile exception.' Since contraband was usually concealed
within a package of some sort, precluding all closed packages
79 Id. at 755.
so Id. at 763-64.










from the search of a vehicle would thwart the goal of the Court
in Carroll.89 To avoid that outcome, the Court in Ross decided
that the scope of a warrantless search allowed by the automobile
exception should be of the exact magnitude as the search would
have been if a warrant had been secured ° The Court ex-
plained:
the scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by
the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather
it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is
probable cause to believe that it may be found.
9 1
Thus, the Court held that probable cause to search a law-
fully stopped vehicle empowered the officer to search "every
part of the vehicle and its contents" that might hold the contra-
band sought.2
Following Ross, it quickly became evident that two parallel
rules controlled the area of automobile searches. If an automo-
bile search was based upon probable cause as to the car, gener-
ally, then Ross controlled. Thus, any closed containers found
within the car that might contain the object of the search could
be opened during the search. If, however, probable cause for
an automobile search extended only to a particular package in
the car, then Chadwick-Sanders controlled. Any package other
than the one suspected by probable cause could not be opened
without a warrant.
4. The Refinement ofRoss in Acevedo
This dichotomy of search rules was unified by the Court's
decision in Califbrnia v. Acevedo.93 The Court noted that any pri-
vacy being offered by Chadwick-Sanders was certainly minimal,
because any package that officials could not open on the spot,
they could seize and hold until they had secured a warrant.9'
The Court also noted that allowing officers to look inside con-
89 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). The Court wanted to provide
a practical way to seize "contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an
automobile." Id.
9 Ross, 456 U.S. at 825.
", Id. at 824.
'21d. at 825.
92'500 U.S. 565 (1991).
' Id. at 575.
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tainers seemed like a minimal intrusion, considering officers
with broader probable cause are permitted to tear up uphol-
stery.95 To put an end to the confusion caused by the two com-
peting standards, the Court held that Ross should apply to "all
searches of containers found in an automobile," regardless of
the scope of the probable cause.96
Justice Stevens dissented in Acevedo, arguing that a distinc-
tion should be maintained between cases like Chadwick-Sanders,
where probable cause is container-specific, and cases like Ross,
where probable cause is general to the vehicle. Claiming first
that the majority had expanded the scope of the automobile ex-
ception, Justice Stevens restated one of the points established in
Chadwick, that people possess a greater expectation of privacy in
their luggage than their automobiles.9 Next, he pointed out
how the rationale behind the Ross rule-that the loss of evi-
dence and the practical necessity of being able to open the con-
tainer where the contraband is likely hidden-are not
applicable to Chadwick-Sanders cases, because the suspected con-
tainer can be legally seized and held by the police until a war-
rant is obtained. While this ready "seizability" led the majority
to conclude that no harm would be committed by simply allow-
ing the officer to open the container on the spot, Justice Stevens
disagreed.' ° He argued that the warrant requirement served
the important function of injecting impartiality into the law en-
forcement process.0 1 It should not, therefore, be brushed aside
as an inconsequential hurdle. ' 2
Justice Stevens concluded by disputing the majority's three
primaryjustifications for the expansion of the Ross rule. 0 3 First,
he challenged the notion that lower courts were floundering in
confusion over these two standards.9 4 Next, he argued that the
protections afforded by Chadwick-Sanders are anything but
95 Id. at 576.
6Id. at 579.
Id. at 585-602 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
Id. at 588 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
Id. at 592 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
' Id. at 585-88 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
'0' Id. at 586-87 (Stevens,J, dissenting)
Id. at 585-88 (StevensJ, dissenting).
"'Id. at 593-602 (StevensJ., dissenting).
10" Id. at 594 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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minimal.'0 5 Finally, he disputed the accuracy and the relevancy
of the claim that the dual rules had hampered law enforce-
ment.1' 6
D. SEARCHES OF PERSONS/PROPERTY OTHER THAN THE ORIGINAL
TARGET OF THE SEARCH
1. Visitors to Premises Searched
The Supreme Court has never commented directly on the
search of an unsuspected visitor's belongings during the search
of fixed premises.10 7  However, various lower courts have
adopted three separate tests to deal with this issue: the "physical
proximity" test, the "relationship" test, and the "notice" test.0 8
The "physical proximity" test, adopted by a minority of courts,
examines the physical connection between the person and the
item searched, to ascertain whether the item will be treated as
an extension of the person's body, and thus, will be protected
from a search.1' 9 The "relationship" test evaluates the connec-
tion between the person, the item searched and the location."0
'05 Id. at 598-99 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
" Id. at 600-02 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
107 The Court confronted a similar but distinguishable situation in Rawlings v. Ken-
tucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). In that case, police officers went to the house of Lawrence
Marquess, armed with a warrant for his arrest. Id. at 100. While searching for Mar-
quess, the officers noticed the odor of marijuana in the house and saw marijuana
seeds on the mantel in one of the rooms. Id. Only then did the officers detain the
four occupants of the house. Id. During the ensuing search, the officers searched
the purse of one of the visitors, Vanessa Cox. Id. at 101. That search differs from the
cases contemplated by the text above, because the probable cause triggered by the
marijuana smoke and seeds led the officers to suspect all of the people present.
Therefore, this is not a case where officers with a warrant to search a house happen
upon an unexpected visitor while searching the premises.
"8See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AImENDMENT § 4.10(b) (3d ed. 1996).
" See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 977, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding
that purse of visitor to premises searched under warrant could be searched because it
was found "resting separately from the person of its owner"); State v. Andrews, 549
N.W.2d 210, 218 (Wis. 1996) (holding that police could search for object of search in
all possible containers except those physically possessed by persons not mentioned in
the warrant).
110 See, e.g., United States v. Young, 909 F.2d 442, 445 (1lth Cir. 1990) (stating that
the court "must consider the relationship between the object, the person and the
place being searched"); United States v. Gray, 814 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that jacket of visitor to house searched for narcotics could be searched when visi-
tor was there late at night while drug sale occurred outside).
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If the item searched, or its owner, have more than a transient,
ephemeral relationship with the location, then they are subject
to search."' Finally, the "notice" test relies on what the officers
should objectively know about certain items prior to searching
them."
While it has never ruled on the search of a visitor's belong-
ings during the execution of a warrant, the Court addressed the
issue of the search of a visitor's person in Ybarra v. Illinois. In
Ybarra, officers were executing a search warrant upon a tavern
they suspected was being used for heroin sales by a particular
bartender named "Greg."'1 4 The search warrant authorized the
police to search "[t]he Aurora Tap Tavern... [and] the person
of 'Greg,' the bartender .. . [for] evidence of the offense of
possession of a controlled substance."'"5 During the search, one
of the officers patted down the patrons of the bar."6 After pat-
ting down Mr. Ventura Ybarra for the second time, the officer
removed from Ybarra's pocket a cigarette pack, and, from
within the pack, six foil packets containing what later turned
out to be heroin." 7 The trial court denied Ybarra's motion to
suppress the foil packets; he was convicted; and the state appel-
late court affirmed his conviction."8
The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that the
search of Ybarra's pockets violated his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.'19 Swayed by the fact that no individualized
probable cause existed toward Ybarra when the warrant was
executed, the Court rejected the conclusion of the state appel-
late court that, in such a small bar, Ybarra must have had a con-
nection to the suspected heroin trafficking.'2 2 The Court
asserted that "a person's mere propinquity to others independ-
.. Young, 909 F.2d at 445.
,,2 See e.g., State v. Thomas, 818 S.W.2d 350, 359-60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)
(holding that police may not search items they "knew or should have known" be-
longed to a "mere visitor").
"s 444 U.S. 85 (1979).




... Id. at 89-90.
"9Id. at 96.
,20 Id. at 91.
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ently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give
rise to probable cause to search that person."
12'
2. Passengers in Automobiles
Only one previous Supreme Court case, United States v.
DiRe, 22 has assessed the constitutionality of a search based on
probable cause of the person or property of an automobile pas-
senger-defendant. DiRe arose out of an investigation by the Of-
fice of Price Administration into alleged possession of
counterfeit gasoline ration coupons.'2 Tipped by an informant
regarding an impending coupon transaction, an investigator
trailed a car to a designated location in Buffalo, New York,
where he approached the car and found three people inside:
the informer, Mr. Buttitta (the alleged seller), and Mr. DiRe.
24
The informer claimed to have just purchased the coupons in his
possession from Mr. Buttitta, and the investigator took all three
occupants of the car into custody and transported them to the
local police station.'2 Once there, the investigator asked Mr.
DiRe to empty his pockets, in which he had two gasoline and
numerous fuel oil ration coupons.2 Subsequently, Mr. DiRe
was "booked" and thoroughly searched.'2 In an envelope con-
cealed between his shirt and underwear were found one hun-
dred gasoline ration coupons.28 All of the coupons recovered
were determined later to be counterfeit.'2 The District Court
held the search illegal and the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed.8
The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the Government's
proposal that the right to search a car without a warrant be ex-
tended to authorize the search of the person of any occu-
pants. '3 In addition, the Court pondered how the Government
could advocate such a holding while refusing to argue that the
121 Id.
" 332 U.S. 581 (1948).









"' Id. at 587.
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search warrant for a dwelling includes the right to search all of
the occupants of the dwelling.1 2 The Court concluded that it
was "not convinced that a person, by mere presence in a sus-
pected car, loses immunities from search of his person to which
he would otherwise be entitled."
3 3
3. Consensual Searches
As just noted, before Houghton, the Supreme Court had
never before confronted a case where a contested search based
on probable cause involved the belongings of an automobile
passenger-defendant. This issue has arisen, however, in the case
law surrounding consensual automobile searches. Consensual
search law draws a sharp distinction between passengers and
drivers with regards to expectations of privacy. In consensual
search cases, generally, federal and state courts have held that a
driver may consent to a search of the vehicle without the pas-
senger's consent or knowledge, but the scope of the permitted
search will not include the belongings of the passenger, unless
the searching officer could reasonably believe the belongings to
be under the actual or constructive authority of the driver.'M
One recent case, State v. Friedel,4 1 5 is extremely similar to Hough-
ton. In Friede, after a male driver consented to a search of his
van during a traffic stop, the police ordered the driver, his fe-
male passenger, and her child out of the vehicle.8 6 When the
officer came across a purse in the back seat, he opened it and
found methamphetamine and marijuana. 37 The Court of Ap-
peals of Indiana first concluded that the passenger had a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in her purse." Since the driver had
neither actual or constructive authority over the purse, the
court held that the driver's consent to search his automobile did
"'Id.
... See, e.g., United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. In-
fante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. French, 974 F.2d 687 (6th Cir.
1992); cf. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (stating that third-party con-
sent can lead to valid warrantless search of apartment, if police have reasonable belief
that third-party has common-authority over the apartment).
,u 714 N.E.2d 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
,T Id. at 1235.
1I7 id.
'38 Id. at 1236-37.
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not include consent to search a passenger's purse left behind on
the back seat when the passengers were ordered from the car.'39
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the early hours ofJuly 23, 1995, Wyoming Highway Patrol
Officer Delane Baldwin stopped a 1977 Cadillac for speeding
and driving with a faulty brake light.141 In the front seat of the
vehicle were three people: David Young (the driver), his girl-
friend (a minor), and Sandra Houghton. 141 Shortly thereafter,
two other officers joined Officer Baldwin. When Officer
Baldwin approached the vehicle and asked Young for his
driver's license, registration, and insurance information, he no-
ticed a hypodermic syringe in Young's left front shirt pocket.
43
Leaving the three occupants of the car under the supervision of
the other officers, Officer Baldwin retrieved gloves from his pa-
trol car.'44 He then ordered Young to exit the vehicle and to
place the hypodermic syringe on the hood of the car.145 When
Officer Baldwin asked Young the purpose of the syringe, Young
responded that he used it to take drugs.
Next, the other officers ordered the two female passengers
out of the vehicle and asked them for identification. 14 Hough-
ton falsely identified herself as "Sandra James" and claimed to
have no identification. 4s All three occupants were then patted
to check for weapons. 49 When no weapons or contraband were
found on the occupants, Officer Baldwin began a search of the
passenger compartment of the car.5 ° In the middle of the back
"'Id. at 1240.
"o Brief for Petitioner at 2, Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999) (No. 98-
184).
,' Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1299 (1999).
4 Respondent's Brief at 1, Houghton (No. 98-184).




,41 Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1299. Though not contested by Respondent in this case,
the Court has previously ruled that a police officer may order a passenger to exit a
vehicle pending the completion of a traffic stop without illegally "seizing" the passen-
ger. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997).
,48Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1299.




seat, Officer Baldwin found a closed lady's purse, to which
Houghton claimed ownership.5 Officer Baldwin opened the
purse and found a wallet containing a photo driver's license
correctly identifying respondent as Sandra Houghton.' When
asked why she had provided false information, Houghton re-
plied, "in case things went bad."53 Officer Baldwin then re-
moved from the purse a brown bag, to which Houghton denied
ownership or knowledge of how it came to be in her purse."4 In
the brown bag, Officer Baldwin found a syringe containing 60
ccs of methamphetamine and other drug paraphernalia. Af-
ter finding fresh needle marks on Houghton's arms, Officer
Baldwin placed her under arrest.155 Searching the purse further,
Officer Baldwin discovered a black bag containing more drug
paraphernalia and a syringe containing 10 ccs of methamphet-
amine, of which Houghton admitted ownership. Young and
the other female passenger were released. 55
Houghton was charged with possession of methamphet-
amine in a liquid amount greater than three-tenths of a gram,1
5 9
a felony in the State of Wyoming.'6 Prior to trial, she filed a
motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the search of her
purse as fruit of a search conducted in violation of her rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.61 In denying
'5' Petitioner's Brief at 3, Houghton (No. 98-184).
152 id.
153 Id.
"' Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1299.
,55 Id.
156 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Houghton (No. 98-184).
157 id.
,,Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363, 365 (Wyo. 1998).
,'WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1031(c) (iii) (Michie Supp. 1996).
'6° Petitioner's Brief at 4, Houghton (No. 98-184).
1' Id. Houghton also claimed violation of her rights under Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyo-
ming State Constitution. Respondent's Brief at 12a, Houghton (No. 98-184). (The
only textual difference between Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming State Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment is that the Wyoming section requires that an "affidavit," rather
than an "Oath or affirmation" support the probable cause underlying a warrant.)
However, counsel for Houghton did not differentiate between the federal and state
protections at the hearing for the motion to suppress. Id. at 15a-25a. In turn, the
trial judge mentioned only the federal right and Supreme Court case law in his Deci-
sion Letter. Id. at 27a-28a. Similarly, the Wyoming Supreme Court declined to un-
dertake any separate analysis of Houghton's rights under the state constitution.
Houghton, 956 P.2d at 366 n.2. The court had previously stated that it would interpret
the federal and state constitutions as providing the same scope of protection against
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the motion, the trial court relied on Acevedo6 2 and held that
once the officer had probable cause to search a vehicle for con-
traband, he was entitled to search all containers therein that
could hold the contraband.6' Houghton was subsequently con-
victed and appealed the denial of her motion to suppress to the
Wyoming Supreme Court.r'
By a divided vote, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed
the conviction. '6 The court began its analysis by analogizing the
situation at bar to one where a visitor is present at searched
premises.ls ' The court discussed the three approaches taken by
various state courts when faced with this issue 16 and then
adopted the "notice" test, which the court felt offered the "best
balance between the legitimate interests of both the individual
and law enforcement."' Tailoring the "notice" test to the con-
text of automobile searches, the court advanced the following
rule: while searching an automobile based on probable cause, a
police officer may search all containers within the vehicle which
may contain the object of the search, unless the officer knows or
should know that the container belongs to a passenger not sus-
pected of criminal activity, and no one had the opportunity,
prior to the search, to place the object of the search in the con-
tainer. 6
unreasonable searches and seizures, unless the party claiming that the state constitu-
tion provided more protection presented appropriate state constitutional analysis.
Gronski v. State, 910 P.2d 561, 566 (Wyo. 1996). Thus, since Houghton did not "dis-
tinguish the protection afforded by the Wyoming Constitution from that of it- federal
counterpart" in presenting her appeal, the court would analyze her claim under fed-
eral constitutional protection only. Houghton, 956 P.2d at 366 n.2. However, since
the Respondent's case came before the Wyoming Supreme Court, that court has re-
considered when it will undertake an independent state constitutional analysis. See
Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 482-84 (Wyo. 1999). In Vasquez, the court declared
that "a state constitutional analysis is required unless a party desires to have an issue
decided solely under the Federal Constitution." Id. at 485. Therefore, if Houghton
brought her appeal today, the Wyoming Supreme Court would have to analyze her
claim through the lens of the state constitution.
'" California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).




..7 See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text for discussion of the three tests.
'68 Houghton. 956 P.2d at 369-70.
,61 Id. at 372.
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The State of Wyoming filed a timely petition for rehearing
which the court denied on April 28, 1998.17° The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari on September 29, 1998.7'
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORIIY OPINION
Writing for the majority,'72 Justice Scalia reversed the Wyo-
ming Supreme Court's decision and held that a police officer
with probable cause to search a vehicle may search all contain-
ers within the vehicle that might contain the object of the
search, including any passengers' belongings" Thus, accord-
ing to the majority, the search of respondent's purse by Officer
Baldwin was not an unreasonable search in violation of her
Fourth Amendment rights.74
The Court began its analysis by framing the Fourth
Amendment inquiry as a two-step process.'75 First, a court must
ask whether the action in question would have been an unlawful
search under the common law existing at the time of the fram-
ing of the Constitution.176 Second, should this primary inquiry
yield no clear answer, a court must evaluate the action under
the traditional reasonableness standard of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence: the balancing of the individual's privacy interest
against any legitimate government interests served by the ac-
tion.
77
0o Id. at 863.
"'Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 31 (1998).
, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas and Breyer
joinedJustice Scalia.
" Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1304 (1999).
174 rd.
'7' Id. at 1300. Both Justice Breyer's concurrence and Justice Stevens' dissent ques-
tioned the propriety of this formal bifurcation of the Fourth Amendment inquiry
and, specifically, the majority's apparent readiness to rely on historical information
alone to render its decision. Id. at 1304-06. However, in this case, at least, the issue
was largely moot, because while the majority claimed to reach its decision upon his-
torical principle alone, it nonetheless proceeded with the second step of the inquiry.
Id. at 1302-04. Regardless of the correctness ofJustice Scalia's formulation, this two-
step inquiry has since been adopted by various lower courts. See, e.g., State v. Friedel,
714 N.E.2d 1231, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).




In answering the first question, the Court noted that both
Carroll and Ross discussed how the common law existing at the
time of the framing might have approached the search of an
automobile. 178 In Carroll, the Court concluded that the common
law of the time would have approved of the warrantless search
of an automobile based on probable cause to believe that the
car contained contraband.'79 This conclusion was based on leg-
islation enacted by Congress between 1789180 and 1799 that al-
lowed customs officials to conduct warrantless searches of
vessels they believed to be carrying goods subject to duty.8'
Similarly, in Ross, the Court, relying in part on Carroll and the
legislation discussed therein, deduced that any customs officials
allowed to search a vessel would surely be allowed to pierce the
containers in which those goods were secured.8 2 Thus, the Ross
Court held that a police officer with probable cause to search a
vehicle can search any part of the vehicle and any containers
therein which may hold the object of the search.8  Finally, Jus-
tice Scalia concluded that the historical evidence discussed in
Carroll and Ross made no distinction between packages based on
ownership.' 4 In sum, the Court found the historical evidence to
support the rule they announced in the instant case.15
Nevertheless, the Court undertook the second question of
its Fourth Amendment inquiry and concluded that the govern-
ment's interest in effective law enforcement outweighed
Houghton's privacy interests. 186 With regards to the interests of
the generic passenger, the Court first noted that a passenger,
like a driver, has a diminished expectation of privacy in any
property transported by car.87 The Court next distinguished
DiRe and Ybarra as cases where the subject of the search in ques-
78 id.
'79 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149-50 (1925).
... Section 24 of the Act of 1789 states, in relevant part, "[t]hat every collector...
shall have full power and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall
have reason to suspect any goods... subject to duty shall be concealed." Act of July
31, 1789, § 24, 1 Stat. 43 (1790).
'8' Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149-51.
'81 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982).
'"3 Id. at 821.
'"Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1301 (1999).
185 Id.
'" Id. at 1302-04.
187 Id. at 1302.
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tion was not the property of an unsuspected party, but the
party's person. The majority added that searches of one's per-
son, unlike the search here, would trigger a "significantly
heightened protection. ""9
Turning to the government interests at stake, the Court
cited three aspects of the Wyoming Supreme Court's "passen-
ger's property" rule that would hinder effective law enforce-
ment. First, the Court recalled the original rationale for the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement, namely, that
the "ready mobility" of a car made it impractical to require an
law enforcement officer to seek a warrant to search the car
without risking the loss of potential evidence.1 9' In the opinion
of the Court, excluding any belongings of a passenger from an
officer's search increased that risk of lost contraband.192 Sec-
ond, based on an assumption of common enterprise between
the passenger and driver of a car, the Court argued that crimi-
nals who were aware of the "passenger's property" rule would
hide contraband in passenger's belongings, with or without the
passenger's permission or knowledge. Third, the Court sur-
mised that the "passenger's property" rule would encourage
passengers to claim ownership of every container within a vehi-
cle.19 From such a rule would flow a "bog of litigation," where
various courts would wrestle with questions of whether owner-
ship had been established and whether an opportunity to hide
contraband in a passenger's things actually existed.
1 95
The Court concluded its opinion with a consideration of
the general practicality of the Wyoming Supreme Court's rule.96
It pointed out that, should the logic behind the arguments of
Justice Stevens' dissent and the Wyoming Supreme Court be ac-
cepted, protection against searches in situations similar to the
one here would have to be extended beyond a passenger's be-
longings to anything that did not belong to the driver. This
1 Id.
189 Id.
'9' Id. at 1302-03.
' ' Id. at 1302.
192 Id.
g' Id. at 1302-03.
9 Id. at 1303.
195 Id.
'6Id. at 1303-04.
117 Id. at 1303.
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would further complicate the task of identification, whether
performed by an officer in the field or ajudge 98 In the major-
ity's opinion, the more practical and sensible ruling would be to
reject this proposed exception to the rule of Ross in favor of a
simpler approach which gives no importance to the ownership
of any package or the presence of the alleged owner.9
B. JUSTICE BREYER'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Breyer wrote separately to comment on the major-
ity's reasoning process and on the scope of the majority's hold-
ing. 0 First, Justice Breyer argued that while analysis of
historical interpretation should inform a Fourth Amendment
question, it should not be determinative of the inquiry.2 1 Next,
Justice Breyer agreed with the majority's adoption of the bright-
line rule of Ross and noted that it is a rare automobile search
where the officer does not have probable cause to suspect all
passengers.2  Thus, the extension of Ross here will permit an
otherwise illegal search in only a small fraction of cases.03
Nevertheless, Justice Breyer proposed a number of limita-
tions for the majority's holding. First, Justice Breyer warned
that the majority's rule applied only to automobiles and only to
containers within the automobile.05 Moreover, Justice Breyer
said explicitly what the majority only implied, that the majority
rule does not extend to searches of a passenger's person.
Second, Justice Breyer seemed tempted, if only for a moment,
to recognize a purse as an extension of the person, due to the
"especially personal" nature of the items carried in apurse, and
thus, to generally exempt purses from a Ross search.20 However,
an admonition from the Court in Ross not to draw distinctions
based on the nature of the container, coupled with the seeming
indifference Sandra Houghton exhibited toward her purse, pre-
198 Id.
'9 Id. at 1303-04.
' Id. at 1304 (BreyerJ., concurring).
20,Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
212 Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
203 Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
205 Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
21 Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
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vented Justice Breyer from succumbing to that temptation. °8
Finally, Justice Breyer admitted that he would be inclined to
give increased protection to agurse, if the owner was wearing
the purse at the time of search.
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens dissented 21 0 from the majority, arguing that
the enduring requirement of either a warrant or individualized
suspicion prior to the commission of a legal search demanded
affirming the Wyoming Supreme Court . In Justice Stevens'
opinion, the distinction in this case should be drawn, as it was in
DiRe, between the suspected driver and the unsuspected pas-
senger, not, as the majority would have it, between the passen-
ger's person, including the contents of his pockets, and the
property unattached to the passenger. Justice Stevens further
argued that any search involving a person's briefcase or purse
might be just as intrusive as the search in DiRe.1
Next, Justice Stevens challenged the majority's conclusion
regarding the pertinent message of Ross. 4 While the majority
read Ross as eschewing any distinctions based on the type of
container involved in the warrantless search of a vehicle, Justice
Stevens argued that this directive was intended only for con-
tainers which were themselves already the subject of probable
cause. To wit, he quoted from Ross, that the scope of the
search "is defined by the object of the search and the places in
which there is probable cause to believe it may be found.21 6 In
addition, Justice Stevens categorically rejected the majority's as-
sumption of common enterprise between the passenger and
driver of a car based simply on physical proximity.27 In justice
Stevens' opinion, Officer Delane Baldwin should have had to
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
"MJustices Souter and GinsburgjoinedJustice Stevens in dissent. Id. at 1304.
2,, Id. at 1305 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
" Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2,3 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2, Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
,"Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2,6 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824
(1982)).
217 Id. at 1305-06 (StevensJ., dissenting).
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have probable cause to believe Houghton's purse contained
contraband before being permitted to search it. 
8
Turning to the balancing of individual and government in-
terests, Justice Stevens concluded that the interest of effective
law enforcement did not outweigh the privacy interests in-
volved.219 On one hand, Justice Stevens felt the intrusion in the
instant case could have been just as intrusive as the search of
Michael DiRe's outer clothing.22 Against that backdrop, Justice
Stevens felt the individual privacy interests involved here were
not worth sacrificing for the "ostensible clarity" of the majority's
rule.2 1 Justice Stevens expressed confidence that the police
could operate under the Wyoming Supreme Court rule, at least
as well as criminals could manipulate it.222 Finally, Justice Stev-
ens asserted that "a rule requiring a warrant or individualized
probable cause to search passenger belongings is every bit as
simple as the Court's rule; it simply protects more privacy.,
2 1
V. ANALYSIS
In Houghton, the Court had before it a novel situation whose
resolution required a choice between two overlapping case
lines. Both DiRe-Ybarra and Ross-Acevedo cast a shadow over the
search of Sandra Houghton's purse. DiRe-Ybarra suggested that
while this purse might be the extension of a random person in
the wrong place at the proverbial wrong time, it and its owner
were still, "clothed with constitutional protection against an un-
reasonable search. 24  Thus, the DiRe-Ybarra case line would
prompt a finding that Houghton's purse could not have been
searched without probable cause to believe that it contained
evidence of a crime committed by Houghton. Ross-Acevedo, on
the other hand, would recommend allowing the search of the
purse. The Acevedo Court wanted no "nice distinctions" based
on the type of container to tarnish the clarity of its new reading
of Ross. that a police officer with probable cause to believe a ve-
hicle contains evidence of a crime may search all containers
2'8 Id. at 1306 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
219 Id. (StevensJ, dissenting).
'2 Id. at 1305 (StevensJ, dissenting).
2' Id. at 1306 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
'2 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting).22 Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
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found therein.2t In Houghton, the Court chose Ross-Acevedo, and
chose incorrectly.
The injustice inflicted upon Sandra Houghton by the
Court's ruling is unfortunate, but the effect this case will have
on Fourth Amendment jurisdiction, as a whole, is even more
226alarming. First, by allowing a search of the belongings of a
person unsuspected of any crime, the Court added unnecessar-
ily to the "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissi-b l e s u s p ci o n l e s s, ,2  7 . -
ble suspicionless searches. Second, by brushing aside the
notion that a passenger in an automobile has any meaningful
expectation of privacy in her belongings, the Court opened the
door to many potential 
intrusions.
A. THE COURT ERRED BYALLOWING A SUSCPICIONLESS SEARCH IN
THIS CASE
Officer Baldwin testified that when he initiated his search of
Sandra Houghton's purse, he had no probable cause to believe
she was engaged in any criminal activity.22 Instead, he based his,
search of her purse upon the actions of David Young, specifi-
cally Young's concession that he used the syringe in his shirt
pocket to use drugs. 2"° Therefore, the search was not based on
any level of individualized suspicion of Houghton.
The Supreme Court has held that a search or seizure con-
ducted without at least "some quantum of individualized suspi-
' United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982).
226 As Justice Stevens eloquently concluded his dissent in Acevedo, "It is too early to
know how much freedom America has lost today. The magnitude of the loss is, how-
ever, not nearly as significant as the Court's willingness to inflict it without even a col-
orable basis for its rejection of prior law." California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 602
(1991) (StevensJ, dissenting).
22 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
228 Based on the rule in this case, numerous searches would be permitted that di-
rectly violate the Fourth Amendments goal of eradicating general, arbitrary searches.
For example, anyone riding in a taxicab to the airport would be vulnerable to having
his or her luggage removed from the trunk and searched should the driver have a
joint behind his ear. All of the executives riding downtown in their daily carpool
would have to give up the contents of their briefcases if the driver's breath smells like
vodka. And the hapless hitchhiker would be helpless when a police officer notices a
hypodermic needle sticking out of the pocket of the complete stranger kind enough
to give the hitchhiker a ride.





cion"231 will be considered unreasonable unless it "serves special
governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforce-
ment.",2 2 In Houghton, however, the Court failed to heed this
principle. The Court neither addressed the absence of individ-
ual suspicion here, nor mentioned any special governmental
need served by the search. Instead, the Court simply mentioned
the lower expectation of privacy people have in their automo-
biles and curtly applied the same lowered expectation to pas-
21sengers. 3 Then, the Court proclaimed that a "car passenger-
unlike the unwitting tavern patron in Ybarra-will often be en-
gaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the
same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their
wrongdoing. , 23 Without any foundation for its assertion, the
Court abandoned the proposition that Sandra Houghton de-
served any status as an individual in that car. It saw her only as
an extension of the suspect, David Young. This branding of
Houghton as an obvious co-conspirator, simply because she was
a passenger in Young's car, directly contradicts the weight of
precedent. In Ybarra the Court spoke directly against making
this type of assumption:
Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a per-
son must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to
that person. This requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing
to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search and seize an-
other or to search the premises where the person may happen to be. . . [E] ach
person who walked into the Aurora Tap Tavern on March 1, 1976, was
clothed with constitutional protection against an unreasonable search or
an unreasonable seizure. That individualized protection was separate
and distinct from the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protection
possessed by the proprietor of the tavern or by "Greg" lthe premises and
person described in the warrant] y5
2" United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976).
02 Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
23 SeeWyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1302 (1999).
234 id.
"'Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1979) (emphasis added). Justice Rehn-
quist dissented in Ybarra, commenting that it was "reasonable to assume that any one
or more of the persons at the bar could have been involved in drug-trafficking." Id. at
106. However, he went on to add: "This assumption, by itself, might not have justified
a full-scale search of all the individuals in the tavern." Id. Apparently, he does not
qualify his assumption of Sandra Houghton's criminality in the same fashion.
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Apparently, the Court in Houghton ignored this warning,
because it felt that a car, more than a small bar, was an intimate
setting where common enterprise could be safely inferred.236
However, the Court in DiRe concluded otherwise and was "not
convinced that a person, by mere presence in a suspected car,
loses immunities from search of his person 237 to which he would
otherwise be entitled.'' 0 8 It is clear that the majority in Houghton
unfairly tainted the respondent with suspicion based on her
proximity to a suspected criminal.
Had the Court recognized that they were being asked to
approve a suspicionless search and undertaken the appropriate
inquiry, they would have found several reasons to find this
search illegal. Compared to previous contexts where the Court
has condoned suspicionless intrusions, the search of Hough-
ton's purse was at once more intrusive and lessjustifiable. It was
clearly not one of those "limited circumstances, where the pri-
2 ' See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1302.
237 This quote refers to a passenger's person, including his outer clothing, rather
than his belongings. The majority distinguished DiRe from the instant case as a
search of a passenger's person, which deserved "significantly heightened protection
... against searches." Id. at 1302. The Court may be implying that it would have
found differently if Houghton had removed her purse from the car. Justice Breyer,
in his concurrence, made a similar insinuation. See id. at 1304 (Breyer, J., concur-
ring). However, any confidence that this decision would have come down differently
if Sandra Houghton had taken her purse with her when she exited the vehicle is de-
flated by three practical considerations. First, should the Court rule differently in
that slightly different context, it will have adopted the "physical proximity" test, de-
scribed in its opinion by the Wyoming Supreme Court as one of the approaches
adopted by States to evaluate the privacy rights of a visitor to a searched premises. See
Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363, 367-68 (Wyo. 1998). This particular test has been
adopted by a small minority of states and has been criticized for the erratic results it
yields. See id. at 368. Second, when ordered from a vehicle for an apparent search,
citizens do not think to gather their belongings, perhaps acting on the assumption
that their separation from the car will be brief. Cf State v. Friedel, 714 N.E.2d 1231,
1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that by leaving purse in van during consensual
search, passenger had not "relinquished her property with no intention of reclaiming
it"). Third, a police officer, especially one concerned about the possibility that the
occupants of a car are armed, will likely be alarmed if he or she sees a passenger
grabbing a bag on their way out of the car. Cf State v. Pallone, 596 N.W.2d 882 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1999). In Pallone, as an officer began to search the vehicle incident to the
arrest of the driver, the passenger reached into the car to grab a duffel bag. The offi-
cer ordered the passenger to leave it where it was and testified later that he was wor-
ried the bag might contain alcohol or a gun. Id. at 884. See also State v. Parker, 987
P.2d 73 (Wash. 1999) (en banc). All of these considerations diminish the chances
that the Houghton rule will soon be clarified in a manner favorable to passengers.
United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948).
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vacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where
an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion
would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized
suspicion. 2 9 The search in Houghton had very little in common
with either the fixed border checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte or the
sobriety checkpoint in Sitz. First, the Houghton search was a
search of personal belongings, not a momentary stop coupled
with brief questioning.240 The former is certainly more of an in-
vasion into personal privacy. The Court in Sitz conceded as
much when it limited its ruling only to a motorist's initial stop at
a sobriety checkpoint. While it called the intrusion of the stop
"slight, 24 ' it opined that "[d] etention of particular motorists for
more extensive field sobriety testing may require satisfaction of
an individualized suspicion standard., 24 A second difference
between Houghton and Sitz or Martinez-Fuerte is that no evidence
has been presented in Houghton to suggest that Officer
Baldwin's search was made in response to a compelling gov-
ernment interest akin to preventing illegal immigration or
eradicating drunken driving. Consequently, the Court cannot
evaluate the efficacy of Officer Baldwin's actions in "ad-
vanc[ing] the public interest ''2 41 involved, as was done by the
Court in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte. Finally, this was not a search
conducted at a fixed point but rather by a roving patrolman.
Thus, according to the Court in Martinez-Fuerte, the practice is
more susceptible to "discretionary enforcement activity," and
the subjective invasion of a person's privacy is "appreciably"
higher.'" In sum, viewed through the lens of precedent, the
suspicionless search conducted in this case was completely un-
reasonable.
B. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ANALYSIS OF HOUGHTON'S
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
In Houghton, the majority spent exactly six sentences dis-
missing Sandra Houghton's expectation of privacy in her
" Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1988).
210 See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1299.




43 Id. at 453.
214 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558-59 (1976).
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21purse. Unfortunately, the Court's discussion was as misguided
as it was brief. Houghton's expectation of privacy in her purse
deserved more complete analysis and more deference from the
Court.
1. The Court Ignored the Implicit Importance of Self-Determination
a. The Three (Secret) 46 Principles of Privacy Expectation
Analysis
An examination of the factors that have traditionally influ-
enced the Supreme Court's determinations of expectations of
privacy in various contexts reveals that a common thread runs
throughout. In almost every situation, the common denomina-
tor of expected privacy analysis is the self-determination of the
person involved.247  Three principles, all related to self-
determination, become evident. All three function, like secret
rules, to sway the recognition of legitimate privacy. First, when
the person in question has exercised choice or free will in plac-
ing themselves in the path of a foreseeable intrusion, the Court
is less likely to validate their expectation of privacy. An example
of the first principle comes from the context of airport searches.
In United States v. Edwards,248 a Second Circuit case cited with ap-
proval in Von Raab, an airline passenger's expectation of privacy
in her baggage was lessened by two things: the posted notice of
the possibility of search and the passenger's decision to remain
in line for the metal detector.249 In other words, an intrusion
was forseeable, but the person chose to proceed through the
metal detector and decline alternatives, such as stepping out of
24 See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1302-03. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying
text.
24' This Note calls these principles "secret," because while the Court has been com-
fortable for thirty-four years now determining what expectations of privacy society
would recognize as reasonable, it has never bothered to explain to society its methods
for so determining.
21 See Michael D. Granston, Note, From Private Places to Private Activities: Toward a
New Fourth Amendment House for the Shelterless, 101 YALE LJ. 1305 (1992). Granston
makes a similar critique of expectation of privacy analysis. This Note argues that the
lack of choice people have in not being passengers in a car should not be held against
them when it comes to Fourth Amendment protections. Similarly, Granston argues
that the homeless have no opportunity to secure their privacy within a house. There-
fore, they should enjoy Fourth Amendment protections in public places.
248 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974).
2
49 Id. at 501.
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line and traveling'by train.250 Therefore, that person could not
reasonably expect absolute privacy in his or her baggage."'
The second discernable principle holds that where the self-
determination of the person has been precluded by a special re-
lationship with the government, the Court will also consider
their expectation of privacy to be unfounded. The second prin-
ciple emerges when the Court addresses closely-regulated indus-
tries, like railroads, and custodial relationships, like
schoolchildren, prisoners, and probationers.
The third principle predicts that the Court is most likely to
find a valid expectation of privacy where an average citizen, who
has no special connection to the state, is attempting to make
relatively minor life choices about everyday activities, while car-
rying routine personal items, runs haphazardly into an invasion
of their privacy.23 For instance, in Minnesota v. Olson, the Court
held that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in his host's home. 4 The Court first noted how staying
overnight with others was a "long-standing social custom."
Then, the Court emphasized how a person could go wherever
he pleased during the day, but when he needed to sleep, he
25
0 id.
251 Id. at 501; see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding no expectation
of privacy in marijuana plants spotted by police helicopter growing in partially-
covered greenhouse because helicopter flights at that altitude were common enough
to be foreseeable and home owner left the roof open); California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35 (1988) (holding no expectation of privacy in trash placed on curb for collec-
tion because trash bags voluntarily placed in a position where numerous other parties
might open the bags); cf Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) ("The ra-
tionale of the plain view doctrine is that if contraband is /eft in open view and is ob-
served by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a
legitimate expectation of privacy.") (emphasis added).
212 See, e.g., Skinner V. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1988)
(holding that privacy interests diminished by participation in a heavily-regulated in-
dustry); NewJersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that while schoolchildren
can expect some reasonable expectation of privacy in their belongings, it is reduced
by the needs of school officials to maintain order).
'3 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709 (1987) (holding that doctor had legitimate expectation of privacy in desk he had
used for 17 years, had never shared with anyone, and contained only personal items);
TLO, 469 U.S. at 339 (holding that schoolchildren have some legitimate expectation
of privacy in their belongings, because students must bring to school, not only their
school supplies, but also their personal effects).
21 Olson, 495 U.S. 91.
2" Id. at 98.
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would seek a place of privacy.26 The Court believed its ruling
"merely recognized the every day expectations of privacy that we
all share. '5 7
b. The Three Principles and Automobile Drivers
The Court evokes all three principles when assessing the
privacy expectations of automobile drivers. It has ruled repeat-
edly that people possess a lower expectation of privacy in their
automobiles, because cars "trave[1] public thoroughfares," "sel-
dom serv[e] as... the repository for personal effects," and are
subject to "pervasive" government regulation.25 8 The justifica-
tion that cars "trave[1] public thoroughfares" evokes the first
principle, because the Court feels the drivers are voluntarily
placing themselves in the path of a possible intrusion.25 9 Simi-
larly, the justification that cars are subject to "pervasive" gov-
ernment regulation, evokes the second principle, by lumping
automobile operators with those who choose to be railroad
workers and customs agents.260 At this point, even though the
first two principles have gone against the privacy rights of the
automobile driver, the Court might still have recognized the
driver's expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable if it
found that a driver's experience satisfied the third principle.
This might occur, as it did in O'Connor v. Ortega and New Jersey v.
T.L. 0., if the Court felt the driver had no choice but to bring
personal items into the automobile. However, when the Court
commented that the automobile "seldom serv[es] . . . as the re-
pository for personal effects,"26' it foreclosed the applicability of
the third principle.
c. The Three Principles and Automobile Passengers
Some have been critical of the Court's justifications for low-
ering the expectation of privacy for American drivers.2 62 Never-
theless, for the purposes of this Note, the propriety of the
Court's actions toward drivers is irrelevant. However correct the
25 Id. at 98-99.
2,7 Id. at 98.




262 See generally Adams, supra note 62, at 841-42.
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Court may have traditionally been regarding a driver's expecta-
tion of privacy, the Court in Houghton erred when it blindly
shifted the same reduced expectation onto a passenger.161
The experience of passengers is different from that of driv-
ers. And it is sufficiently different that all three principles iden-
tified above favor a respected expectation of privacy for
passengers. Regarding the first principle, people have little
choice but to be passengers as part of their daily lives, and, thus,
they are not placing themselves voluntarily in the path of a fore-
seeable search. In 1990, 96.9% of Americans rode to work in a
car, light truck, or some form of public transportation./ In that
same year, 43 million people were revenue-paying passengers in
cabs and 15.4 million people carpooled to work everyday. Jf
staying overnight at another's house is a "long-standing social
custom," riding in automobiles cannot be far behind. Passen-
gers do not voluntarily wander onto public highways.2 They
have no choice. And furthermore, while riding in an automo-
bile, a passenger has almost no control over the foreseeable in-
trusions the car will encounter. For similar reasons, the second
principle of privacy analysis favors a legitimate expectation of
privacy for passengers. Since it is not the passengers who are
purchasing and maintaining a possession subject to pervasive
government regulation, why should that regulation be used to
undermine their Fourth Amendment rights?
Finally, a passenger in a car is likely to have his personal be-
longings with him, and those belongings will likely be consoli-
2" See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1302 ("Passengers, no less than drivers, possess a re-
duced expectation of privacy with regard to the property that they transport in
cars."). The Court's refusal to view a passenger's expectation of privacy as distinct
from that of the driver contradicts at least one area of automobile search law. The
jurisprudence of consensual searches maintains that individual actions of the driver
to encourage a search may not, in fact, affect the privacy rights of the passenger. See
supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of consensual automobile
searches.
2'4 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OFTHE UNITED STATES: 1998, at 636 (118th ed. 1998).
Id. at 635, 646.
An astute reader might wonder why the passenger is not expected to find an-
other way. Why is the automobile passenger any different from the airline passenger
in U.S. v. Edwards who was expected to find another mode of transportation if un-
happy with the possibility of search? The answer is that car travel is so much more
common than airline travel that it is much less reasonable to ask an American to go
without cars than without planes.
908 [Vol. 90
WYOMING v. HOUGHTON
dated in closed containers. In this way, a passenger better ap-
proximates the people covered by the third principle of privacy
expectation analysis, people who are going through their lives,
doing what they cannot avoid, carrying with them what they
must76 In sum, passengers' general lack of self-determination
and control of their situation should have led the Court to re-
spect their reasonable expectations of privacy.
2. The Court Exacerbated the Damage done to Ross by Acevedo
In one respect, the Court in Houghton cannot be blamed for
its myopic approach to passenger privacy. The Court was simply
following the precedent of Ross-Acevedo.269 While the Court
mentioned Ross throughout its opinion, and cited Acevedo only
once, 2' Ross, properly read, protects the privacy interests of pas-
sengers. It is only Ross as modified in Acevedo that provided any
foundation for the majority's holding.
The opinion in Ross served both the interests of law en-
forcement and the privacy interests of individuals. Police offi-
cers with generalized probable cause to believe a vehicle
contained contraband would not have to stop if they came
across a container that possibly held the contraband.27' And if
probable cause happened to be specific to a particular con-
tainer, occupants would still enjoy the privacy interest they ex-
pected for the suspected piece and other pieces of luggage.272
Ross remained committed to the notion that privacy interests in
luggage were "substantially greater than in an automobile. 273
Nine years later, however, the Court in Acevedo altered thissoun pice f juicil . 274
sound piece of judicial reasoning. Acevedo removed the war-
"7 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979) ("Automobile travel is a basic,
pervasive, and often necessary mode of transportation to and from one's home,
workplace, and leisure activities. Many people spend more hours each day traveling
in cars than walking on the streets.").
' Cf State v. Parker, 987 P.2d 73, 79 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) ("[V] ehicle passen-
gers hold an independent, constitutionally protected privacy interest. This interest is
not diminished merely upon stepping into an automobile with others.").
211 Wyomingv. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1301 (1999). In addition, the trial court
relied exclusively on Acevedo in denying defendants motion to suppress. Brief for Re-
spondent at 21a, Houghton (No. 98-184).
27 Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1300-04.
"' SeeUnited States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 778, 823 (1982).
272 See id. at 824-25.
2' United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1976).
" See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
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rant hurdle for searches where probable cause for an automo-
bile search was specific to a container. In doing so, the opinion
in Acevedo violated the clear edict of Ross "that the scope of the
warrantless search authorized by [the automobile exception] is
no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legiti-
mately authorize by warrant."27" 5
If an analogy is drawn casting the three passengers in
Houghton as three separate "containers," then it is clear how the
transgression of Acevedo led to the decision in Houghton. Ana-
lyzed this way, Officer Baldwin had container-specific probable
cause based on his knowledge of one container, David Young.
He had probable cause to suspect that container of containing
contraband, but not the two other containers, Sandra Hough-
ton and Young's girlfriend. Therefore, according to Ross, the
limit of Officer Baldwin's search would have ended there, with
David Young, because he had no other containers in which
"there [was] probable cause to believe that [the object of the
search] may be found.276 If, on the other hand, he had prob-
able cause based on information about the car generally, then
he could search all three containers inside.
2 Ross, 456 U.S. at 825.
276 Id. at 824. The Court and the dissent quote the same passage from Ross, that
the scope of a warrantless car search "is defined by the object of the search and the
places where there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." Id. However,
the dissent focused much more on the last phrase. The dissent's reading of Ross de-
serves special deference, if for no other reason, than for the fact that Justice Stevens
authored the opinion in Ross. One should be inclined to believe that he has special
understanding of the intended meaning of the opinion. In the majority opinionJus-
tice Scalia disputed the dissent's reading of Ross. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S.
Ct. 1297, 1301 (1999). He theorized that the Court in Ross would have mentioned if
the rule were limited to drivers. Id. But considering that, prior to Ross, no case had
yet emerged calling into question the search of an unsuspected passenger's property,
it seems hardly realistic to have expected the Court in Ross to have contemplated
every possible set of circumstances to which the rule could be applied. Further, per-
haps the Court in Ross felt their admonition about probable cause was clear enough
not to be misread. As a final response to justice Scalia's query, is it not just as plausi-
ble-and perhaps more plausible-that the Court in Ross would have mentioned that
their rule allowed officers to dismiss any need for probable cause toward the passen-
gers before ransacking their belongings?
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C. THE PASSENGER'S PROPERTY RULE ADOPTED BY THE LOWER
COURT IS SUPERIOR
In a number of respects, the ruling of the Wyoming Su-
preme Coure7 7 is superior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Houghton. First of all, the lower court's ruling did not diverge
from precedent as egregiously as did the majority of the Court
in Houghton .278 Instead, the lower opinion respected the tradi-• g - . .. P •• P279
tional requirement of individualized suspicion. It properly
recognized the scope of an automobile search, as authorized by
Ross, to be only as wide as a search based on a warrant would be
in similar situation.2 0 And it recognized that a passenger may
have a meaningful expectation of privacy in her belongings by
analogizing Officer Baldwin's search to the search of the be-
longings of a visitor to a searched building.
281
In addition, despite the concerns of the majority, the Wyo-
ming Supreme Court's passenger's property rule is workable.
The Court's fear that such a rule would drop the courts into a
"bog of litigation"28 2 is overstated. As Justice Breyer recog-
nized, 83 the passenger's property rile would apply to only a
small fraction of the total automobile searches conducted daily.
In most cases, a police officer's probable cause to search the car
extends to all of the occupants.
For example, if, during a routine traffic stop, an officer
smelled marijuana in the passenger compartment, or saw pills
or empty beer bottles strewn on the floor, he would have prob-
able cause to suspect any and all of the occupants of criminal
activity. As a result, the passenger's property rule would not ap-
ply. Therefore, it is unlikely that courts applying this rule would
find themselves frantically interpreting issues involving estab-
lishment of ownership.
Similarly, the Court feared that once the passenger's prop-
erty rule was widely promulgated, passengers involved in auto-
mobile searches would begin to claim that everything in the
vehicle was theirs in order to protect otherwise discoverable
2- Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363 (Wyo. 1998).
'8 See supra Parts VA-B.
219 See Houghton, 956 P.2d at 366.
2 See id. at 367.
2' See id. at 367-70.
21
2 Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1303 (1999).
2"' Id. at 1304 (BreyerJ., concurring).
20001
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
contraband. This fear is also unsubstantiated . Many rules
regulate automobile searches that arguably favor the occupants
of the car. However, automobile occupants could hardly be said
to abuse such rules. Instead, they often seem unaware of the
protections at their disposal, or they succumb to the intrinsic
authority of the officer. For example, few drivers realize that
they are free to decline or limit an officer's request to search
their vehicle.t
Moreover, should this logic not placate the judges and po-
lice who will have to put the rule into action, a number of
measures could be taken to simplify the inquiry, whether on the
road or the bench. For example, the courts could interpret the
establishment of ownership by a passenger to require more than
a simple identification of the item purportedly owned by the
passenger. Passengers could be required to provide some sort
of reasonably objective confirmation of ownership. The passen-
ger could be forced, in the presence of the police officer, to
remove something from the bag with his name on it. Or, if no
identifying article was contained in the container, the passenger
could tell the officer the first thing the officer will see should he
open the container.
284 Perhaps the best response to the majority's speculation about exploitation of
the passenger's property rule comes from Justice Scalia himself. In National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), Scalia dissented from the majority
opinion which upheld the constitutionality of urine testing for certain Customs Serv-
ice. Id. at 678. Since the case asked the Court to approve a suspicionless search, the
Court was required to find that keeping Customs agents drug-free was a "special gov-
ernmental need[.]" Id. at 665. The Court believed this requirement was satisfied by
the fact that the agents came in frequent contact with drugs and drug traffickers. Id.
at 666-70.
Scalia, however, was not convinced. He considered the reasoning of the majority
"supported by nothing but speculation, and not very plausible speculation at that."
Id. at 682 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). He continued: "What is absent in the Government's
justifications-notably absent, revealingly absent, and as far as I am concerned dispo-
sitively absent-is the recitation of even a single instance in which any of the speculated
horribles actually occurred." Id. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Concededly, the fact
patterns involved in these two cases are vastly different, but the question naturally
presents itself. If Scalia was so uncomfortable with speculation over the existence of a
threat to law enforcement in Von Raab, why is he so eager to speculate about the
ramifications of affirming the lower court in Houghton?
28. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 289 (1973) (Marshall, J., dis-




If the passenger could satisfy either of these requirements,
then the police officer would exempt the container from any
further searching. If the policeman noticed anything incrimi-
nating while conducting a test to determine of a passenger truly
was the owner of a container, it could be seized under the plain
view doctrine.2 6 This type of inquiry should not be foreign to
police officers.287 They already make this sort of determination
on a routine basis in the context of consensual stops. 28 Specifi-
cally, police officers determine that a driver can consent to the
search of a third party's belongings only if the officers can rea-
sonably conclude that the driver has common authority over the
belongings.289
All of these suggestions aside, at some point, consideration
of the difficulties a constitutionally mandated procedure will
impose on the police must cease. As Justice Stevens declared in
Acevedo:
[T] he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can
never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment ... [TIhe
Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of
Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may not be to-
tally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of
the criminal law.W
Considering the manner to which the majority of the Court
denigrated Sandra Houghton's privacy interests in this case, the
26 The ruling of the Wyoming Supreme Court permitted a police officer with
probable cause to search a vehicle to search any container therein, until he knew or
should have known that the container belonged to an unsuspected passenger.
Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363, 372 (Wyo. 1998). In other words, his right to search
was assumed until proven otherwise.
The plain view doctrine allows a police officer with the right to be in a particular
position the ability to seize contraband viewed from that position. See, e.g., Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Therefore, the plain view doctrine would
apply to anything the police officer observed in a Houghton-type search, until he
learned the container belonged to an unsuspected passenger.
27See State v. Parker, 987 P.2d 73, 83 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) ("Officers in the field
routinely make, often subtle, factual determinations of probable cause, articulable
suspicion, and the like... [I]t is not overly difficult to determine to whom a personal
effect belongs.").
2 See e.g., State v. Friedel, 714 N.E.2d 1231, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
289 rd.
2w California v Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 601 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf Parker, 987
P.2d at 83 ("The need for a 'bright line' rule, as urged by the State, does not over-
come a nonarrested individual's privacy interest.").
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time has come to stop worrying about minor inconveniences for
police officers and start worrying about the burdens imposed on
the other side of the scale.
VI. CONCLUSION
In an attempt to bring cohesion to an area of law referred
to by some as a "doctrinal mess,"2' the Supreme Court in Hough-
ton stretched the rule set forth in Ross2 2 by holding that prob-
able cause to search a vehicle justified searching every container
within the vehicle which may contain the object of the search
regardless of ownership. In the Court's opinion, the common
law in place at the time of the framing of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the goals of effective law enforcement, and the minimal
privacy interests of passengers justified the extension of the rule
put forward in Ross.
However, in its haste to simplify the field, the Court unnec-
essarily undermined basic principles of Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence and stripped passengers in vehicles of many of the
protections they previously possessed. The Court disregarded
the established importance of individualized suspicion and cre-
ated a new exception to that requirement without properly justi-
fying its actions.
Meanwhile, the Court neglected the expectation of privacy
a passenger might reasonably possess in the integrity of her be-
longings while riding in someone else's vehicle. At the same
time, the Court wrongly rejected as impractical a lower court
rule, which respected both the privacy of passengers and the in-
terests of law enforcement.
Before the Court can reestablish the proper safeguards for
automobile passengers' privacy, it must realize that its decisions
in Houghton 9 and in AcevedoF4 constitute an improper step away
from the principles of Ross and the Fourth Amendment, gener-
ally. Until the Court recognizes that it has strayed, passengers
2" See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757,
759 (1994).
2' United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
2' Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999).
29 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
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on American roads are afforded a shockingly low level of Fourth
Amendment protection.25
DanielJ. Hewitt
2 Passengers may be saved the vulnerability condoned by Houghton if their state
courts grant them greater protections under their state constitutions. For an exam-
ple of a state court refusing to follow Houghton on state grounds, see State v. Parker,
987 P.2d 73 (Wash. 1999) (en banc).
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